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ABSTRACT: Existing subsidy arrangements and institutional settings in the Indonesian electricity sector distort investment 
decisions and lead to higher cost. Electricity supply is characterized by natural monopoly characteristics, requiring different 
management by governments than sectors with more straightforward market characteristics. Many countries have undergone 
significant re-structuring of their electricity sectors, away from one, state owned and vertically integrated monopoly supplier to a 
setting whereby competition has emerged either at the generation level and/or the retail level. Transmission and distribution 
networks are typically heavily regulated and transparent access arrangements are put in place as part of the restructuring efforts. 
The analysis showed that the current structure of Indonesia’s electricity sector firmly within Model 2 (the single buyer model) and 
highlights that Indonesia is currently towards the less-competitive end of the spectrum of Model 2, identifying significant potential 
for efficiency enhancing reforms within this structure. Constitutional limitations have hampered previous efforts to restructure the 
sector in Indonesia but there is significant room for incremental reform to improve incentives in the sector and reduce the cost of 
generation in the process. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis the growth in new 
electricity generation in Indonesia has struggled to keep 
up with demand. From 1997 to 2007 demand growth 
averaged 7 per cent per year (International Energy 
Agency 2008) but the increase in supply has been 
lagging behind. The slower than necessary pace of 
investment in new generation capacity means that by 
2010 Indonesia had an estimated supply shortfall of 4.5 
GW in 2010 (Jakarta Globe 2010) or an output shortfall 
of around 100 billion kwh per year. In 2009, it was 
estimated that energy output was some 170 billion KWh 
well short of the 260 – 290 billion kwh that would have 
needed to avoid rationing (Jakarta Globe 2010).  
Compounding the challenge posed by the existing 
supply shortfall, growth in demand for electricity is 
forecast to average 9.5 per cent per year out to 2029 
and beyond with likely higher rates outside the main 
Java-Bali grid (Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources-MEMR 2012). In addition to building new 
supply capacity Indonesia will also have to replace 
aging infrastructure. Reuters has reported that PLN’s 
current generation capacity is around 25,000 MW 
although actual daily output is far less because most of 
its plants are old and inefficient. This suggests that 
there may need to be substantial new investment in 
supply just to maintain existing output let alone meet 
new demand. 
To satisfy this level of demand Indonesia will have to 
build an additional 7.8 GW of new capacity on average 
each year for the next 20 years. This is significantly 
more than the average of less than 1200 MW that were 
added over the five years to 2009. The capacity to 
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satisfy the projected increase in demand for electricity 
will be of critical importance to Indonesia as it fuels 
economic growth. Unmet demand and supply 
disruptions – which invariably result from less installed 
capacity than is required – undermine the 
attractiveness of Indonesia as an investment 
destination and harm its competitiveness. Supply 
expansion is also essential to satisfy the GOI’s goal of 
increase electrification rates from around 66 percent in 
2008 to 80 per cent by 2014 (National Medium Term 
Plan 2010 – 2014) and more than 90 per cent by 2020 
(MEMR 2012).  
The low electricity tariffs and the high subsidization 
of the PLN have become one of the biggest structural 
problems in the Indonesian electricity sector. Those 
conditions are responsible for developing an inefficient 
electricity market structure that is also unreceptive to 
both foreign and domestic investment. With artificially 
low electricity tariffs, and the government subsidizing 
the bulk of electricity production costs, most foreign 
investors and power operators that have the potential 
to alleviate some of the acute electricity shortages in 
Indonesia, have kept their distance (Purra 2010). With 
the existing tariff levels most power projects are 
financially unviable particularly for many of the 
multinational power companies.  
Based on the aforementioned background, this study 
was conducted in order to analyze the Indonesian 
existing electricity market arrangements and the 
opportunities to glean lessons from International best 
practices of efficient arrangements in electricity sector. 
This study follows the following structure. In the 
beginning, this study elaborates the concept of natural 
monopoly. Further, the study provides a brief picture of 
Indonesia electricity sector arrangements and their 
history. Then, this paper goes through four different 
possible electricity industry structures that represent 
increasing penetration of competition in the Indonesia 
electricity sector. 
This paper utilizes a descriptive methodology 
analysis. The secondary data are employed to support 
the analysis. In-depth interviews with some experts and 
focus group discussions are also part of the research 
methods employed in this study.    
2. Literature Review 
According to Sherer (1980), a natural monopoly can 
be found in an industry where a single business firm can 
produce total output to supply the market at a lower 
per unit-cost than can two or more firms (subadditivity 
of the cost functions). Another definition of natural 
monopoly was that of Baumol (1977), who argued that 
a natural monopoly exists when a single firm opeates in 
a market in which entrants are incapable of survival, 
even in the absence of predatory measures by the 
incumbent monopolist (sustainability of monopoly). 
Utilities such as electricity, telecommunication, 
water and gas are often cited as examples of natural 
monopoly (Kim & Horn 1999). These industries 
confront a relatively high fixed cost structures which 
the costs needed to produce even a small amount are 
high. Successively, once the initial investment has been 
made, the average costs decrease with every unit 
produced. Competition in these industries is deemed 
socially undesirable because the existence of a large 
number of firms would result in needless duplication of 
capital equipment (Depoorter 1999).  
In the context of the electricity sector, the network 
component of the supply chain has the strongest natural 
monopoly characteristics. While generation facilities 
can feasibly be duplicated (or separated) and compete 
in a market with sufficient size, the economies of scale 
associated with building and operating a network are 
such that duplication is unlikely to ever be feasible. For 
example, Yarrow (1994) observes that the most 
European Union countries follow the model of a 
competitive or potentially competitive generation 
sector and a natural monopoly network sector. This 
observation implies a different approach to regulating 
the generation and network elements of the electricity 
sector. Under the correct market structure (e.g. 
diversified ownership) and regulatory regime 
competition in the generation sector can result in 
economically efficient outcomes and market-
determined prices. Conversely, the natural monopoly 
network sector is likely to require extensive regulation 
or government involvement to ensure economically 
efficient outcomes.  
This occurs because, as observed by Depoorter 
(1999), the natural monopoly concept poses a public 
policy dilemma. On the one hand, a natural monopoly 
implies that efficiency in production would be better 
served if a single firm supplies the entire market. On the 
other hand, in the absence of any competition the 
monopolist will be tempted to increase prices so as to 
maximize profits. It is also questionable whether a firm 
will pursue cost minimization under natural monopoly.  
In the context of electricity networks, two broad 
responses to natural monopoly have been observed 
(Donald 1959). One response is to retain the network in 
government hands, using public pressure on the 
government to constrain the network’s exercise of its 
monopoly power. The other is to privatise or 
corporatize the network (i.e. allow it to operate 
independently of government and pursue profit-
maximisation) but subject it to extensive price and 
access regulation to ensure economically efficient 
outcomes.  
The different treatments of generation and network 
elements are reflected in the different models of 
electricity market structure considered in subchapter 
below. The models discussed describe a broad evolution 
from non-competitive to competitive electricity 
markets, and illustrate how the potentially competitive 
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generation sector is firstly opened to competition, with 
the retail sector following, whilst the non-competitive 
network components are regulated separately. 
3. Discussion and Analysis 
a. Natural Monopoly in the Indonesian Electricity Sector 
The Indonesian electricity sector is characterised by 
heavily subsidized tariffs to end consumers (Pintz & 
Korn 2005). Based on the latest Fiscal Policy Agency 
data of 2013 (Fig. 1.), it shows the trend of electricity 
subsidy in Indonesian state budget for the last 12 years. 
Although the electricity subsidy fluctuated between 
2007 and 2013, overall the subsidy has shown an 
increasing trend. Subsidised tariffs effectively entrench 
a government monopoly in the supply of electricity to 
end users (electricity retailing) in Indonesia, as no 
private entity would compete to supply customers at a 
loss-making tariff.  Consequently the state-owned 
company PT PLN exclusively retails electricity in 
Indonesia. The extent to which allowable tariffs are 
below generation costs. The trend of electricity’s 
subsidy, are shown in the Table 1. 
For a long time, retail electricity prices in Indonesia 
have been influenced by political considerations (World 
Bank 2005) and therefore future increases from 
subsidised to cost-reflective levels will likely occur 
gradually.  Further, for political reasons, prices are 
regulated to be uniform across regions, creating a cross 
subsidy between Java (where economies of scale make 
generation costs relatively low) and other islands. The 
breakdown of PLN subsidies by user class in 2010 and 
2011 are shown in Table 1. 
Whilst tariffs differ between user classes, the pattern 
of tariffs are not cost-reflective and create distortions 
across consumer  classes. A competitive electricity retail  
environment would require not only the general level of 
electricity tariffs to be cost-reflective, but also that 
tariffs for different user classes are also cost-reflective. 
Based on the data of PT. PLN (Fig. 2), it can be seen the 
proportions of electricity subsidy between different 
classes of customers per month, although it can not 
clearly define the cost-reflectiveness. 
Some private participation has gradually emerged in 
Indonesia’s electricity generation sector. Prior to 1985, 
the power sector was entirely government-led, under 
the direction of the state-owned company PT PLN. In 
1985 the Government issued Law No. 15/1985, 
allowing the participation of the private sector in 
electricity generation for its own use and to sell to PT 
PLN. The law sought to permit limited participation in 
electricity generation. Essentially, the law allowed for 
private parties (Independent Power Producers/IPPs) to 
supply electricity in Indonesia which was previously 
exclusive to PLN. These IPPs were licensed to sell their 
electricity solely to PLN pursuant to Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs). A power purchase agreement 
(PPA) is a contract for the sale of energy, availability 
and other generation services from an independent 
power producer (IPP). It is normally developed 
between the owners of private power plants and the 
buyer of the electricity. However, this IPP program was 
effectively frozen in the late 1990s when the financial 
crisis hit. 
Electricity restructuring in Indonesia began in early 
1992 when the Government opened the electricity 
generation market to competition. Following 
Presidential Decree No. 37 of 1992, which opened entry 
into generation markets, a number of permits have been 
issued for Independent Power Producers (IPP) to build, 
install and operate power plants, and sell the generated 
electricity to PT PLN for distribution to the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Trend of Electricity Subsidy 
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Table  1.  
Average PLN Tariffs  
Tariff Class 
2010 2011 
Revenue 
(Million Rp) 
Subsidy 
(Million Rp) 
Revenue 
(Million Rp) 
Subsidy 
(Million Rp) 
  S.1 / 220 VA 153 1.559 116 1.273 
  S.2 / 450 VA 101.276 264.004 100.927 338.668 
  S.2 / 900 VA 159.799 254.320 167.806 360.433 
  S.2 / 1.300  VA 115.016 115.850 137.100 178.579 
  S.2 / > 2.200 VA 107.055 93.540 129.344 151.277 
  S.2 / > 2.200 s/d 200 kVA 1.036.124 685.812 1.226.513 1.028.658 
  S.3 > 200 kVA 720.686 408.426 915.249 586.211 
Sub Total S 2.240.109 1.823.511 2.677.054 2.645.099 
  R.1 / s/d 450 VA 7.767.008 14.003.419 7.849.024 19.045.898 
  R.1 / 900 VA 11.541.896 10.917.259 12.505.715 17.438.553 
  R.1 / 1.300 VA 6.460.099 4.246.264 8.601.575 6.807.422 
  R.1 / 2.200 VA 4.089.127 2.626.665 5.207.934 4.000.516 
  R.2 / > 3.500 s/d 5.500 VA 3.292.967 1.412.097 3.804.794 2.157.570 
  R.3 / > 6.600 VA 2.637.533 - 2.859.512 561.791 
Sub Total R 35.788.630 33.205.703 40.828.554 50.011.751 
  B.1 / s/d 450 VA 153.395 189.522 147.958 261.115 
  B.1 / 900 VA 366.184 323.945 363.910 483.374 
  B.1 / 1.300 VA 589.131 377.113 721.560 544.560 
  B.1 / 2.200 VA s/d 5.500VA 1.430.397 662.313 2.593.066 1.359.655 
  B.2 / 6.600 VA s/d 200 kVA 11.347.396 430.491 11.001.767 2.214.562 
  B.3 / > 200 kVA 9.246.775 1.740.871 10.183.912 4.244.487 
Sub Total B 23.133.278 3.724.256 25.012.172 9.107.753 
  I.1 / 450 VA 81 115 82 167 
  I.1 / 900 VA 469 462 470 656 
  I.1 /  1.300 VA 923 469 1.003 912 
  I.1 /  2.200 VA 2.953 984 2.568 1.916 
  I.1 /  3.500 s/d 14 kVA 179.600 - 106.580 49.550 
  I.2 / > 14 kVA s/d 200 kVA 3.124.578 1.319.042 3.544.726 2.058.504 
  I.3 / > 200 kVA 23.110.610 11.819.140 27.254.847 18.841.779 
  I.4 / > 30.000 kVA 6.645.263 4.339.239 7.683.198 7.211.048 
Sub Total I 33.064.477 17.479.452 38.593.474 28.164.534 
  P.1 / s/d 450 VA 12.126 8.731 11.120 12.007 
  P.1 / 900 VA 26.111 12.629 26.410 20.788 
  P.1 / 1.300 VA 34.123 16.436 40.303 23.220 
  P.1 / 2.200 VA s/d 5.500 VA 63.418 25.345 127.318 70.790 
  P.1 / 6.600 s/d 200 kVA 1.345.355 3.903 1.361.338 275.745 
  P.2 / > 200 kVA 926.405 325.872 1.092.452 540.386 
  P.3 2.156.509 1.284.316 2.500.075 1.808.696 
Sub Total P 4.564.048 1.677.232 5.159.016 2.751.632 
  T / > 200 kVA 55.871 33.257 57.208 52.375 
  C / > 200 kVA 83.086 72.880 53.434 55.677 
  L 1.491.097 92.126 1.688.031 388.920 
TOTAL 100.420.596 58.108.418 114.068.944 93.177.740 
 
 
Indonesia’s 2002 Electricity Law went further and 
envisaged competition and private participation in both 
electricity generation and retailing. However, in 
December 2004, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court 
annuled the 2002 Electricity Law on the basis that it 
was in violation of the spirit of article 33 of the 
Indonesian Constitution. According to the 
Constitutional Court, electricity is a public good and its 
generation and distribution should remain under the 
exclusive control of the government. 
In effect, the annullment of the 2002 Electricity Law 
reestablished the 1985 law and limited private 
participation in the sector to IPPs generating electricity 
and on-selling to PLN. Whilst IPPs participate in 
generation, this does not occur under competitive or 
even quasi-competitive conditions, but rather as an 
‘out-sourced’ element of the PLN monopoly supply 
chain, meaning that electricity generation in Indonesia 
effectively operates within an essentially non-
competitive structure.  
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Fig. 2 Electricity Subsidy per Customer per Month 
 
 
Together, the low electricity tariffs and the high 
subsidies to PLN have resulted in an inefficient 
electricity market structure that is also unreceptive to 
both foreign and domestic investment. With artificially 
low electricity tariffs, and the government subsidizing 
the bulk of electricity production costs, most foreign 
investors and power operators that have the potential 
to alleviate some of the acute electricity shortages in 
Indonesia, have kept their distance (Purra 2010). With 
the existing tariff levels most power projects are 
financially unviable particularly for many of the 
multinational power companies.  
In 2009, the government passed a new Electricity 
Law to strengthen the regulatory framework and 
provide a greater role for regional governments in 
terms of licensing and in determining electricity tariffs. 
The Law firmly justifies the state as the regulator of 
electricity supply and the PLN as the supplier, as 
stipulated in the article 33 of constitution (Articles 3 
and 4 of the Electricity Law No. 30/2009). The 
substantial change is that the law authorizes the 
provincial governments to publish regulations on 
electricity. It also permits provinces to adjust electricity 
tariffs (Article 5 of the Electricity Law No. 30/2009). 
Whilst these are positive measures to improve the 
operation of the electricity sector, the monopoly 
position of PLN remains largely intact. 
b. Natural Monopoly in the Indonesian Electricity Sector 
There are four basic models for electricity industry 
structure that represent increasing penetration of 
competition in the sector: 
1. Model 1: Vertically Integrated Monopoly 
2. Model 2: Single Buyer Model  
3. Model 3: Wholesale Competition 
4. Model 4: Retail Competition 
As discussed below, the present circumstances in 
Indonesia place it within the broad definition of Model 2 
(the single buyer model). However, variation within this 
model exists and Indonesia is towards the less-
competitive end of the spectrum of single buyer 
electricity market models.  
 
Model 1: Vertically Integrated Monopoly 
 
This model operates via a geographic monopoly on 
selling electric power to consumers, where all of the 
aspects of the electricity supply chain, i.e. generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing, are conducted 
by a single utility within its region (Stănciulescu 2004; 
Andika & Dewanda 2004). In this model, customers 
have no alternatives except to purchase electricity from 
their own local utility and so there is no competition at 
the retail level. Further, the utility generates and 
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distributes all electricity itself, implying no competition 
between generation sources.   
Typically electricity sectors take this form in 
countries that have not pursued market-oriented 
reforms. Given the evident market power the vertically 
integrated power company (VIPC) wields under this 
model, it is typically government-owned and voluntarily 
constrains prices for political reasons. Before the 
enactment of Electricity Law of 1985, Indonesia 
employed this model with PLN taking the role of the 
vertically integrated monopoly (as illustrated in Fig.3).  
Such an arrangement usually results in implicit or 
explicit government subsidies to sustain the viability of 
the entity. In turn, this often creates poor incentives to 
minimise costs, which are therefore inefficiently high. 
This observation reflects the experience in Indonesia. In 
effect the Government of Indoenesia has ensured a 
certain price to protect customers by subsidizing the 
difference between the true cost and the regulated 
price. As this subsidy comes from state budget, the 
ongoing costs damage the GOI’s financial position. 
Although Indonesia has moved from this model to a 
versoin of the ‘single buyer model’ discussed below 
since 1985, the essential difficulties of the vertically 
integrated model remain present in Indonesia’s 
electricity sector today.  
As an alternative to government-ownership and 
political constraints on electricity prices, some 
jurisdictions (notably a range of US states) employ what 
is called ‘rate of return’ regulation to set electricity 
prices charged by a VIPC. This regulation involves 
estimating in advance the reasonable costs associated 
with delivering all elements of the electricity supply 
chain and setting regulated tariffs that allow the 
operator to earn revenues to recoup these costs, plus a 
profit margin. The difficulty with this approach is that 
the VIPC generally perceives such regulation as 
guaranteeing a mark-up on costs, and it must share the 
benefits of measures to reduce costs with consumers 
through future tariff-setting processes. Consequently, 
the incentive for cost-minimisation is diluted and 
efficient outcomes are difficult to obtain.  
 
Model 2: Single buyer/purchasing agency model 
 
The single buyer/purchasing agency model 
represents a movement away from the vertically 
integrated model in the direction of greater 
competition, but the degree of increased competition 
varies depending on several specific design elements. 
Structurally, the key difference is that the VIPC 
(typically government-owned) diversifies its generation 
sources by contracting private investors (IPPs) to 
construct and operate generators. The IPPs sell their 
output to the VIPC, generally via long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs). Generally the VIPC will 
continue to operate its own generators in parallel with 
the IPPs but will be the sole purchasing agency for 
wholesale electricity. Meanwhile, the VIPC will 
coordinate dispatch of the various generation sources 
and maintain the transmission network.  
The single buyer model (Fig. 4) certainly provides an 
emerging electricity sector with access to private capital 
and a diversity of generation companies. However, the 
extent to which it creates competitive pressure is highly 
dependent on detailed design elements. Designs 
representing two extremes of the spectrum of 
competitive outcomes can be identified.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Vertically Integrated Monopoly – Indonesia prior to 1985 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Single Buyer Model / Purchasing Agency as implemented in Indonesia 
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Under the least competitive design of the single 
buyer model, IPPs are used primarily as a source of 
additional capital to supplement the generation fleet of 
the VIPC, which retains overwhelming dominance in 
generating, dispatching and supplying electricity 
(Hassan et al. 2009). There is no centralized or 
transparent mechanism by which the dispatch of IPPs 
or the VIPC’s own generators are prioritised or 
coordinated. Consequently, there is no guarantee for 
IPPs that they will receive equal treatment in dispatch 
alongside the VIPC generators. In turn, the IPPs 
generally seek highly structured PPAs that guarantee 
price and minimise volume risk (known as ‘take-or-pay’ 
contracts). The overall effect is that the dispatch of 
generators is not driven by competitive pressures as 
under a market arrangement, but instead is heavily 
influenced by PPA terms, which are in turn driven by 
the VIPC’s planning requirements rather than a 
decentralised competitive process. Whilst there is some 
competitive pressure through investment in new 
generators, with the VIPC able to compare IPP bids for 
new power plants by their respective PPA prices, this 
competitive pressure is largely limited to the intitial 
investment stage and constrained by determining the 
type and location of plant by the VIPC. In addition, due 
to the ‘take or pay’ structure of PPA’s the VIPC’s ability 
to manage dispatch efficiently can be negatively 
affected. Thus, some of the possible economic 
efficiencies in construction and operation are achieved 
through the current structure but the benefits of 
competition are far from exploited under the current 
structure.  
A more competitive form of the single buyer model 
is described by Lovei (2000). He describes the 
‘mandatory competitive pool’ form of the single buyer 
model, where generators are not shielded from market 
risks by government guarantees, and wholesale prices 
determine dispatch and investment via market rules 
rather than PPAs. This arrangement is very similar to 
the wholesale competition model discussed below, with 
the primary difference being that a single purchaser 
commits to taking all power sold through the 
competitive pool, rather than passing this risk on to 
various distribution or retail companies. As Lovei (ibid.) 
notes, in that case, the single buyer model captures 
many of the benefits of the wholesale competition 
model, but faces specific difficulties associated with 
incentives to pursue collection of electricity tariff 
revenues and government interference in market 
processes.  
Since 1985 a less competitive version of the single 
buyer model has emerged in Indonesia via the gradual 
engagement of IPPs by PLN. Whilst private investments 
in the form of IPP projects have helped reduce the risk 
of power shortages, the absence of a competitive 
mechanism to coordinate IPP and PLN generation 
means that the introduction of IPP generators only 
represents a fairly modest step towards the wholesale 
competition. In essence, the timing, capacity and fuel 
supply choice of new generation investments, as well as 
the day-to-day dispatch of plant, are determined 
internally by PLN rather than transparently through 
market prices. This would be very similar to the 
vertically integrated model described above but may 
actually be worse because PLN may be constrained in 
its choice of which plants to dispatch from as a result of 
take or pay arrangements with IPPs.  
One option for Indonesia would be to improve the 
way in which IPPs bid to build capacity, improving the 
efficiency gains available from competition, without 
affecting the sole buyer position of PLN and consistent 
with the constitutional ruling in 2002.  This is 
elaborated further in the existing lelctricity market 
arrangements chapter. 
 
Model 3: Wholesale competition 
 
Genuine competition is more likely to first emerge at 
the wholesale level (i.e. generation) rather than in the 
network element or in retailing (Song et al. 1999). The 
key difference between this model and the single buyer 
model is the existence of multiple wholesale purchasers 
of electricity rather than a single, central purchasing 
agency that commits to purchase all electricity 
delivered to the system. In Fig. 5, the wholesale 
purchasers are depicted as either distribution 
companies or large customers that arrange their own 
wholesale purchases (e.g. smelters). In this market, 
distribution companies can be thought of as geographic 
monopolies that exclusively purchase, distribute and 
sell electricity to small and medium sized customers in 
a particular region. As the transmission system 
connects multiple such regions, these distribution 
companies can choose between generation sources 
from within and beyond their physical region. This 
choice, in turn, drives genuine wholesale competition 
between generation companies to supply the various 
potential purchasers.   
Transactions between generators and wholesale 
purchasers take place either in a decentralised 
wholesale market governed by bilateral contracts, 
through a centralised power exchange or ‘pool’, or a 
combination of both. In a ‘bilateral’ market, buyers and 
sellers individually contract with each other for 
quantities, price, terms and conditions. There is no 
single transparent market price, and prices are instead 
determined by the terms of individual contracts. As in 
traditional market, buyers and sellers interact directly 
to secure contracts. A bilateral market is similar to less 
competitive forms of the single purchasing agency 
model above, with the key difference that generators 
have a choice of counter-parties with which to agree a 
PPA for their output, allowing generators and off-takers 
to negotiate prices that reflect market conditions.  
A pool trading system creates a centralised and 
transparent mechanism through which generators and 
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wholesale purchasers may interact. In its strongest 
form, this pool is ‘mandatory’ in that all power must be 
bought and sold through the pool. Generators notionally 
sell all their output to the pool, rather than a specific 
buyer and, similarly, buyers are deemed to purchase all 
their output from the pool. A central Independent 
Market Operator (IMO) holds regular auctions where 
generators bid quantities and prices for the specific 
time period. Generators are dispatched in order of 
increasing price to satisfy total demand in the relevant 
time period, and the price of the last bid required to 
‘clear’ the market is treated as the market price for that 
period: all sellers receive and all buyers pay this price in 
that period. Whilst all generation is notionally 
dispatched through the pool, mandatory pool markets 
nevertheless typically develop complementary financial 
contracts that offer participants much of the price and 
volume certainty they achieve in a bilateral contracting 
market.  
Bilateral contracting and pool trading can operate in 
combination. In such markets, contracted quantities are 
dispatched preferentially irrespective of price, and 
generation output in excess of contracted quantities is 
deemed to be sold into the pool and earn the pool 
clearing price. Similarly, purchases by wholesale 
customers in excess of their contracted volumes are 
deemed to be purchased from the pool at the pool 
clearing price. Under this arrangement, pool trading 
essentially acts as a ‘balancing’ market to true-up 
purchases and output that is above or below contracted 
quantities.  
Indonesia is some distance from approaching this 
model of wholesale competition. Firstly, wholesale 
competition requires the creation of multiple potential 
buyers   to  allow  generators  to  negotiate  market  – 
reflective prices. Secondly, market structure issues and 
pre-existing contractual arrangements are not 
conducive to competition between generators. To 
promote competition, PLN’s share of total generation 
capacity would need to be reduced through 
disaggregation into separate companies that would 
compete with one another, and these companies would 
need to be separated from PLN’s transmission and 
wholesale market dispatch functions to ensure fair 
treatment for competing IPPs. Further, existing PPAs 
with IPPs may need to be restructured so as to reflect a 
new competitive environment as well as being 
transferred from PLN to a new wholesale purchasing 
entity (possibly a regional electricity distributor).  
Nevertheless, the emergence of genuine wholesale 
competition through market restructuring would offer a 
number of potential benefits. Firstly, forward-looking 
wholesale prices can be determined by market 
processes rather than planning processes. This dynamic 
motivates potential investors to optimise new entry 
choices across a range of feasible new generation 
options. Secondly, the threat of entry from new 
generators motivates existing generators to minimise 
costs. Thirdly, centralising dispatch through a pool 
mechanism increases the likelihood that short-run 
dispatch decisions minimise operating costs of the 
existing fleet. However, notwithstanding these benefits, 
significant market structure and legal barriers (not least 
the constitutional ruling preserving PLN’s monopoly on 
the sale of electricity to users) means that moves to 
wholesale market competition will be slow and 
tentative in the short-term, likely reflecting adjustments 
within the broader confines of the single buyer model 
described earlier than a dramatic move towards 
genuine wholesale competition.  
Model 4: Retail competition 
Under the wholesale competition model described 
above, small to medium sized customers (i.e. customers 
not large enough to purchase directly from the 
wholesale market) do not have a choice of electricity 
supplier and are dependent on the local monopoly 
distributor/retailer (Sugianto 2010). Accordingly, this 
system lacks retail competition and requires regulation 
of price and access to protect the interest of small 
customers. 
  
 
 
Fig. 5 Wholesale Competition 
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Fig. 6 Retail Competition 
 
 
 Accordingly, the final stage in developing a 
competitive electricity market structure is to facilitate 
competition between the final suppliers of electricity to 
customers, i.e. retailers (Hogan 1993). As the 
distribution of electricity via poles and wires has 
natural monopoly characteristics, this competition 
requires, at least, establishing rules that ensure that 
new entrant retailers that wish to compete with the 
‘incumbent’ retailer-distributor has guaranteed access 
to use of the network on fair and competitive terms or, 
ideally, fully separating the retail and distribution 
functions to guarantee equal access rights for all 
retailers. 
This market structure is shown in Fig. 6, but 
illustrates only one geographic distribution area. As 
under wholesale competition, multiple purchasers 
contract with generators or purchase electricity from 
the wholesale pool. However, multiple retailers also 
compete to supply the same customer via the monopoly 
distribution network, ensuring that consumers have a 
choice of retailers.  
Under genuinely competitive retail market 
conditions, e.g. where the number of retailers is 
sufficient to provide genuine price competition, prices 
can no longer be regulated but can instead by 
determined by competition between retailers (Bohi & 
Palmer 1996). The retail price no longer has to be 
regulated because small consumers can change retailer 
when they are offered a better price. From an 
economics perspective, this model is the most 
satisfactory because energy prices are set through 
market interactions. However, retail competition 
requires considerable amounts of metering, 
communication and data processing to function 
effectively. The cost of the transmission and distribution 
network is still charged to all their users as it is done on 
a regulated basis because these networks remain 
monopolies.  
Full retail competition is notionally the end point of 
restructuring process from monopoly to competition. 
Where market design is efficient and market structures 
are balanced and genuinely competitive (e.g. not 
excessively concentrated in a few company’s hands), 
this model can generate efficiencies in the supply of 
electricity that both attract capital to the supply side 
and benefit consumers through low prices.  However, 
while this may be the culmination of the restructuring 
process described here, reforms in the Indonesian 
electricity sector can provide many benefits described 
here without going all the way to full retail competition.  
See the existing electricity market arrangements 
chapter in this publication for further details about the 
suggested course of action. 
4. Conclusion  
As discussed above, electricity sector reform has the 
potential to improve economic outcomes and reduce 
pressure on the budget. Without prejudicing further 
discussions with other areas of government and line 
ministries and stakeholders, some ideas about how to 
tackle electricity sector reform have been considered 
and potential directions for reform have been identified. 
Our analysis of Indonesia’s electricity sector 
indicates that the ‘single buyer model’ is strongly 
entrenched (with PLN acting as the monopoly 
purchaser and reseller of electricity), not least due to 
constitutional restrictions. However, there is significant  
scope to achieve more efficient outcomes by 
incremental reform within this broad structure. 
Specifically, the interaction between PLN and IPPs 
(particularly the form of PPAs) can be refined to 
encourage behaviours more akin to a competitive 
wholesale market, without relying on the long and 
uncertain process of reforming the sector to a fully 
competitive structure. 
One option would be to create a distinct funding 
envelope for new tranches of generation capacity by 
load centre, perhaps beginning with a portion of new 
investment in parallel to the crash program planning 
model that is currently in operation. IPPs would be 
invited to bid for a share of the funding by offering the 
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largest amount of capacity at lowest cost (distinguishing 
peak, shoulder and base load). 
This would begin a process by which new capacity is 
funded in a technology neutral manner and would allow 
fuel price risk and other operational costs to be 
allocated to IPPs rather than remaining with the 
government. This process would also better harness the 
professional judgement of IPPs with respect to project 
capacity, design, site and fuel selection, as well as 
responsibility for upstream (e.g. fuel supply) 
arrangements. If IPPs made wrong judgement calls 
about such factors, their profits would be negatively 
affected, providing strong incentives to get it right, 
aligning cost-minimisation incentives for the GOI and 
IPPs.  
Under such a model, PLN would coordinate and 
dispatch generation from a variety of sources and 
integrate the generation and transmission network 
planning. It would be desirable to give PLN additional 
space to focus on transmission – a critical aspect of 
electricity supply and one that has enormous influence 
on overall costs. Of course, detailed development of 
such reforms would require extensive engagement 
within the government line ministries, PLN and 
industry stakeholders representing IPP viewpoints.  
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